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  In 1991, an incident at the Michigan Womyn’s Music Festival set in motion a vigorous 
debate about the boundaries of feminist identity.  The Michigan Womyn’s Music Festival is an 
annual event creating an all-female space that is as much about politics as it is about music.
1  
Although the event is popular among lesbians, it welcomes heterosexual women; men, on the 
other hand, are prohibited.
2  That year, a woman named Nancy Jean Burkholder was expelled 
from the festival because she was transgender.
3  She was first approached by a group of festival 
participants, who then reported her to authorities.
4  The festival subsequently established a 
“womyn-born womyn only” policy, which transgender activists protested adamantly.
5  
Supporters of the policy argued that it was necessary for maintaining the unique atmosphere of 
the festival to admit only individuals born with two X-chromosomes, which they believed was a 
necessary condition to being an authentic feminist.
6  Opponents argued that the policy was 
discriminatory and itself rooted in patriarchy.
7 
  It is difficult to explain the actions of the women who sought Ms. Burkholder’s expulsion 
from the festival — and the conduct of participants in many other movements that mirror those 
                                                 
1 See Michelle Tea, Transmissions from Camp Trans, BELIEVER, November 2003, available at 
www.mcsweeneys.net/articles/transmissions-from-camp-trans-2003. 
2 See id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Joshua Gamson, Messages of Exclusion: Gender, Movements, and Symbolic Boundaries, 11 GENDER & SOC. 178, 
190 (1997). 
6 See id. at 191–92. 
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actions — as a rational strategy for furthering the goals of the movement.  Generally, we assume 
that numbers are power: a movement gains strength from the population of involved 
participants.
8  Why, then, would these members have wanted to exclude women who identify 
with the movement and are eager to contribute their energy and resources to its cause? 
  An identity-based social movement is the political mobilization of individuals who 
advocate for common reforms to the legal system
9 based not simply on common interests, but on 
common identity.
10  Although some identity movements have championed conservative causes, 
this paper focuses on movements that have advocated changes to the legal system that benefit 
historically oppressed groups — most significantly, but by no means limited to, the African 
American Civil Rights Movement, the Women’s Movement, the LGBT Rights Movement, and 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Jonathan Matthew Smucker, Radicals and the 99%: Core and Mass Movement, in WE ARE MANY 247–
48 (2012) (available at http://www.beyondthechoir.org/diary/145/radicals-and-the-99-core-and-mass-movement) 
(“If [the Occupy Movement is] to effectively challenge the most powerful institutions in the world . . . , we will need 
the active involvement of hundreds of thousands if not millions of people . . . .”); FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD 
A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS xx (Vintage Books Ed., 1979) (“[F]ormal organization presumably 
makes possible the coordination of the economic and political resources of large numbers of people who separately 
have few such resources.”). 
9 Of course, the significant accomplishments of identity movements have not been limited to legal changes.  
However, this paper focuses on legal reforms, in part because they have been such a major focus of identity 
movements’ efforts, and in part because they are easier to conceptualize and quantify than many of the nonlegal 
changes that identity movements have effected. 
10 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the 
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2064 (2002).   REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  2 
the Disability Rights Movement, along with their many smaller offshoots.
11  In the United States, 
particularly in the last century, identity-based social movements have proved an extraordinarily 
forceful vehicle for legal and social change.
12 
  But in spite of their tremendous power, identity-based movements suffer from certain 
devastating dysfunctions.  In particular, their agendas are often largely limited to advancing the 
interests of their most privileged participants.
13  And they frequently exclude a wide swath of 
sympathetic individuals from participating, sometimes in ways that are particularly cruel and 
alienating.  A number of commentators have described these phenomena as they apply to 
specific identity movements.  Most of these treatments have either described these phenomena 
without explaining them
14 or relied on principles of human psychology to explain them.
15  Others 
                                                 
11 Professor Eskridge’s article lists the African American Civil Rights Movement, the Women’s Movement, and the 
Gay Rights Movement as the most significant identity-based movements of the last century.  Id.; see also Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (enumerating “African Americans, other people of color, and gays and lesbians” as 
identity-based political groups).  This paper takes a somewhat broader view of the identity movements that have 
effected or could potentially effect major changes to the American legal system, but most of the examples 
nevertheless come from these foundational movements. 
12 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 10, at 2064 (arguing that the major changes in constitutional doctrine that occurred 
during the twentieth century are attributable to the achievements of identity movements); Crenshaw, supra note 10, 
at 1242 (“[I]dentity-based politics has been a source of strength, community, and intellectual development.”). 
13 See Crenshaw, supra note 10, at 1242. 
14 See, e.g., id. at 1251–52; Darren L. Hutchinson, “Gay Rights” for “Gay Whites”? Race, Sexual Identity, and 
Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358 (2000). 
15 See, e.g., Catherine Smith, Unconscious Bias and “Outsider” Interest Convergence, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1077, 
1284–87 (2008) (applying unconscious bias theory to explain why different oppressed groups have trouble 
recognizing their common interests); Smucker, supra note 8, at 247–248 (2012) (available at REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  3 
have justified the exclusionary and divisive tendencies of social movements on philosophical or 
strategic grounds.
16 
This paper takes a dramatically different approach to the problems of internal divisions 
and exclusionary behaviors in identity-based social movements.  It hypothesizes that social 
inequality itself cause the interests of individual movement participants to diverge from the 
interests of the movement as a whole.  PART I explores how social movements would likely 
constitute themselves in the absence of this social inequality.  Part I.A concludes that they would 
tend to adopt an agenda that is most likely to attain the greatest possible value for their 
participants collectively.  Part II.B argues that as a general matter, established members would 
not rationally reject the contributions of interested new participants.  PART II reintroduces the 
concept of social inequality and examines how it changes the conclusions from PART I as they 
apply to identity movements in particular.  Part II.A concludes that social inequality distorts 
movement agendas such that they tend to maximize movement value for the most privileged 
participants rather than for all participants — a phenomenon this paper refers to as “replication.”  
Part II.B concludes that replication changes the internal dynamics of identity movements such 
                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.beyondthechoir.org/diary/145/radicals-and-the-99-core-and-mass-movement) (“Too often, radicals play 
into our opponents’ divide-and-conquer strategies, by relishing in our radical identity more than we value 
connecting with a broader base.”). 
16 See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, The Other Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379, 382–83 (2009) 
(explaining that the initial internal critique of same-sex marriage as an agenda priority in the LGBT Rights 
Movement subsided so that the movement could present a united front when facing political enemies); Gamson, 
supra note 5, at 179 (“In political systems that distribute rights and resources to groups with discernible boundaries, 
activists are smart to be vigilant about those boundaries . . . .”).  See generally id. at 181–82 (summarizing theories 
about the benefits of boundary policing for group solidarity). REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  4 
that it becomes rational for established members to reject the contributions of potential new 
members whose interests they fear are out of alignment with their own — a phenomenon this 
paper refers to as “purification.” 
  In essence, then, social inequality distorts the incentives of identity movement 
participants in ways that limit the movement’s ability to change the laws and policies that 
disadvantage its members.  Yet it is unlikely that real social movements function in exactly the 
way PART II envisions; instead, real movements probably involve a mixture of the pure models 
from PART I and PART II.  As such, thoughtful leaders of identity movements may be able to 
curb the destructive effects of replication and purification, thereby cultivating healthier, more 
inclusive movements.  PART III offers a few strategies that might enable them to do so. 
 
PART I: Social Movements in a Hypothetical Nonhierarchical Society 
  Every social movement is, at some level, a coalition.
17  Although popular treatments of 
social movements often assume they are monolithic
18 — with uniformity of characteristics and 
interests across the board — even within a tight-knit organization, this assumption is unrealistic.  
                                                 
17 Some commentators have offered a distinction between political action that is based on coalitions between 
differently situated groups and political action that is not based on such coalitions.  See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, 
Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1991).  A basic 
premise of this paper is that this distinction is logically unsound.  To the extent that some movements appear 
monolithic, it may be because they have stifled internal diversity through the mechanisms of replication and 
purification examined in Parts II.A and II.B. 
18 See, e.g., Robert D. Benford, An Insider’s Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective, 67 SOC. 
INQUIRY 409, 422 (1997) (criticizing framing theory, a body of sociological research on social movements, as 
“treat[ing] frames in a singular fashion as though there is a single reality”). REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  5 
Humans possess an infinite variety of characteristics, needs, and desires, so they must always 
compromise when joining others for collective action.
19  That they still do so is a testament to the 
power of organization.  Putting aside the fringe benefits of joining movements, such as 
socialization and emotional catharsis, we can assume that people would not join social 
movements unless they anticipated that the rewards they obtain from the movement’s 
achievements would outweigh the costs of participation,
20 including the costs attributable to 
these inevitable compromises.
21  That means that at the margins, individuals are deciding 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 8 (1965) (“Just as those who belong to an 
organization or a group can be presumed to have a common interest, so they obviously also have purely individual 
interests, different from those of the others in the organization or group”); SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE 
CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 12 (2009) (“Social movements are collections of people 
who feel various affiliations and have a variety of motivations.  The goals, strategies, and ideas of a social 
movement are always evolving and are always contested within the movement.”); OESTREICHER, SOLIDARITY AND 
FRAGMENTATION 4–13, 32 (1986) (describing the vast diversity within the working class population that would 
ultimately form Detroit’s early labor movement); LINDA J. WOODS, LOOKING AT THE GAY RIGHTS AGENDA 
THROUGH A RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER LENS 1–2 (1994) (discussing diversity within the LGBT Rights Movement). 
20 “Costs,” as used in this paper, need not refer to financial costs.  Social movements require a great deal of labor 
and social capital in addition to monetary investments.  See, e.g., Marisa Holmes, The Center Cannot Hold; A 
Revolution in Process, in WE ARE MANY 151 (2012) (detailing the variety of efforts that went into the beginning 
stages of the “Occupy Wall Street” movement). 
21 The use of the word “benefits” in this paper is emphatically not limited to financial benefits.  The achievements of 
social movements frequently benefit their members in primarily emotional or dignitary ways, yet their members still 
find the costs of participation, whether monetary or not, to be justified.  See OLSON, supra note 19, at 61 n.17.  A 
prime example is the efforts of gay rights activists to legalize same-sex marriage even though most of the direct 
benefits of legalized civil marriage are not financial.  But see WOODS, supra note 19, at 15–16 (listing financial 
advantages derived from legal marriage).  In other instances, benefits are both financial and nonfinancial at once.  REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  6 
whether or not to take part in a movement not based on absolute agreement with its core 
objectives, but on whether they agree with enough of its objectives to make participation 
worthwhile.
22 
This Part explores how social movements would define their agendas and sizes in light of 
the diversity of interests they must encompass — but in the absence of the preexisting social 
inequality that might distort these decisions.  In order to do so, it must make a number of 
counterfactual assumptions: first, that participation in the movement has costs that are equal for 
all members; second, that the members are equally able to pursue the movement’s goals; and 
third, that the members stand to benefit equally from the movement’s achievements.  These 
assumptions are false in large part because of the preexisting social and legal hierarchies that 
lurk in the background of every modern social movement and are especially important for 
identity-based movements.  But by examining how movements might function in the 
hypothetical nonhierarchical society, we may begin to understand the effects that these 
hierarchies actually have. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
Not included in this conception of benefits, however, are the intangible rewards that individuals derive from group 
membership itself.  Though immensely important in understanding personal motivations for participating, these 
rewards are not properly characterized as achievements of the movement, but rather as byproducts of the 
interpersonal relationships upon which movements are based. 
22 Anecdotal evidence bolsters this intuition.  See, e.g., Dawn, The Human Rights Campaign: Friend or Foe, THE L 
STOP (Feb. 1, 2013), http://thelstop.org/2013/02/the-human-rights-campaign-friend-or-foe/ (arguing that transgender 
individuals should support the Human Rights Campaign in spite of the organization’s sometimes controversial 
positions on transgender issues); RONALD D. ELVING, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE 39–40 (1995) (describing how 
prominent feminists eventually decided to back an early version of the Family and Medical Leave Act that did not 
provide for paid leave, even though the group had originally opposed such a compromise).  REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  7 
I.A: The Optimal Agenda 
  Imagine a hypothetical society with no social hierarchies but with imperfect laws.  Some 
subset X of these laws is unfavorable to a subset Y of the population, perhaps because they have 
become outdated, or because the lawmakers who created them were incompetent, or for some 
other reason not stemming from social hierarchies.  Specifically, the X laws contain laws m–q, 
which disadvantage individuals with interests a–k respectively, and individuals in subpopulation 
Y all have at least one of the interests a–k.  Subpopulation Y in turn falls into several equally 
sized smaller groups, as the chart below depicts: 
Subpopulation Y 
Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  Group 5 
a (m) 
b (n) 
c (o) 
d (p) 
e (q) 
f (r) 
g (s) 
c (o) 
d (p) 
e (q) 
h (t) 
i (u) 
c (o) 
d (p) 
e (q) 
h (t) 
b (n) 
j (v) 
d (p) 
e (q) 
a (m) 
i (u) 
j (v) 
k (w) 
e (q) 
That is, an individual with interest a is disadvantaged by law m; an individual with interest b is 
disadvantaged by law n; and so forth.  Much as in human society, some interests are rare while 
others are more widely shared.  And some pairs of groups have more in common than others. 
  Subpopulation Y is considering starting a social movement that will attempt to change 
some of the unfavorable laws — perhaps by lobbying the legislature, or by rallying voters, or by 
bringing strategic lawsuits, or perhaps through some combination of these tactics.  The emerging 
movement must settle on an agenda — here, represented by the cluster of laws the movement 
will focus on trying to change.  These groups see a social movement as a potential investment: if 
they are to devote time and energy to trying to change the law, they require the benefits they REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  8 
derive to outweigh the costs of participation.
23  Ignore, for now, the collective action problems 
that systematically emerge from such arrangements;
24 assume that a group can bind itself and all 
of its members to good faith participation ex ante, and that the movement will only go forward if 
all interested groups agree.  Thus, at this stage, the decision of whether or not to participate in a 
movement is a straightforward cost-benefit analysis at the group level.   
  Imagine that each group within Subpopulation Y would gain four units of value for every 
change in a law that currently disadvantages its members.  It stands to reason that the more 
groups participate in the movement, the more likely the movement is to be successful — even 
without factoring in the pooling of resources that is more properly analyzed as affecting costs.  
This is because the larger a movement becomes, the more likely it is that its ideas will gain 
traction among nonparticipants and, eventually, mainstream acceptance.  When ideas gain 
independent momentum, they may begin to influence the legislators, judges, and other public and 
private actors who ultimately decide whether to change the targeted laws.  Suppose, then, that if 
only one group participates in the movement, the chance of success is only 35%, but that the 
probability increases by 10% for each additional participating group.
25  Thus, the expected 
benefit of a movement to a given group can be represented by the equation: 
    = (.1  + ﾠ.25) ∗ 4  
                                                 
23 See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5 (1976).  Although rational choice 
theory is somewhat limited in its application to social movements, it serves as a useful starting point for analyzing 
how a movement might constitute its agenda and membership. 
24 This paper discusses those collective action problems at infra pages 17–19. 
25 These numbers are intended to represent very rough estimates and are only presented for the purpose of making 
more concrete the abstract concepts that this Section discusses. REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  9 
where g equals the number of participating groups and l equals the number of targeted laws that 
affect the group in question.  The gross benefits to participating groups are equal to the sum of 
the B functions of each participating group.  The gross social utility of a movement can be 
calculated simply by adding together the B functions of each benefiting group.  Although it is 
interesting to note how valuable a movement is for Subpopulation Y as a whole, the benefits for 
participating groups are more important in understanding whether or not a movement will go 
forward and who will participate. 
Further, it stands to reason that the more laws a movement targets, the more costly it will 
be, but that the movement can also achieve certain efficiencies by targeting multiple laws.  In 
order to target its first law, the movement must invest in research, tools, and other basic 
infrastructure.
26  After those initial investments have been made, the incremental costs of adding 
a new law to fight against will likely be smaller.  If, for instance, the cost of fighting the first law 
is 10, after which each additional law costs 4, then the cost to the movement as a function of the 
number of laws targeted can be represented by the equation: 
   = 4l + 6 
where C equals total cost and l equals the number of laws the movement targets for change.  If 
the participating groups share equally in this total cost, then the cost for each Group will simply 
be the function above divided by the number of Groups participating.  A Group will only agree 
to participate in the movement if its expected benefits exceed its costs.  Finally, a movement’s 
total social utility can be calculated by subtracting the total costs from the gross social benefits. 
                                                 
26 See OLSON, supra note 19, at 22.  Costs may also begin increasing more rapidly again if the size of the agenda 
increases beyond a certain point.  Id.  If, for instance, a movement chooses a goal that is unrealistic in scope, such 
as, say, overthrowing capitalism, the cost formula in this paper will provide an underestimation of its actual costs.  
Assume, for simplicity, that none of the movements discussed here have such unrealistic ambitions.  REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  10 
Under these assumptions, different agenda clusters correspond with different group-level 
expected benefits and total social utility for Subpopulation Y.  The chart below portrays the most 
promising of these potential movements. 
Cost, Benefits, and Social Utility of Potential Movements 
Laws targeted 
for change 
Participating 
groups 
Benefits – Costs 
for all 
participating 
groups 
Positive 
Externalities 
Total Social 
Utility 
q only  All 5 groups  5, or 1 per group 
(Benefits = 15; 
Costs = 10)  
0  5 
p and q  Groups 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 
6.8, or 1.7 per 
group (Benefits = 
20.8; Costs = 
14). 
2.6 (Group 5 will 
benefit if law q is 
changed.) 
9.4 
o, p, and q  Groups 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 
10.6 (Benefits = 
28.6; Costs = 
18).  Groups 1, 2, 
and 3 gain 3.3 
each.  Group 4 
only gains .7. 
2.6 (Group 5 will 
benefit if law q is 
changed.) 
13.2 
n, o, p, and q  Groups 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 
11.8 (Benefits = 
33.8; Costs = 
22.)  Group 1 
gains 4.9.  
Groups 2, 3, and 
4 gain 2.3 each.)  
2.6 (Group 5 will 
benefit if law q is 
changed.) 
14.4 
m, n, o, p, and q  All 5 groups  22 (Benefits = 
48; Costs = 26.)  
Group 1 gains 
9.8.  Groups 2, 3, 
and 4 gain 3.8 
each.  Group 5 
gains only .8. 
0  22 
m, n, o, p, q, and 
t 
Groups 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 
9 (Benefits = 39; 
Costs = 30.)  
Group 1 gains 
5.5.  Group 3 
gains 2.9.  
Groups 2 and 4 
gain only .3. 
5.2 (Group 5 will 
benefit if law m 
or law q is 
changed.) 
14.2 REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  11 
Under this set of assumptions, a movement targeting laws m, n, o, p, and q would be the 
most valuable to member groups (as well as the most valuable to Subpopulation Y as a whole).  
At first glance, it also appears to be the most likely to actually occur in a world of rational actors.  
Although Group 1 stands to benefit the most from the movement, Groups 2, 3, and 4 benefit 
more than they would from any other movement.  All this depends on the cooperation of Group 
5, however, which enjoys a great deal of leverage in this scenario in spite of its seemingly 
marginal status.
27  Group 5 expects to gain only .8 units of value in the m-n-o-p-q movement.  If 
Group 5 refuses to join, the movement’s probability of success will go down, and fewer groups 
must share the same total cost, such that Groups 2, 3, and 4 will expect to gain only 1.3 units 
each.  Groups 2 and 3 will then prefer to target only laws o, p, and q, since the o-p-q movement 
is worth 3.3 units to them.  The o-p-q movement is better for Group 5 as well, since it expects to 
gain more from free riding on o-p-q than it would gain from participating in m-n-o-p-q.  Group 5 
thus has a powerful incentive to hold out from m-n-o-p-q, and the other groups will likely be 
forced to offer it valuable perks in exchange for its participation.  In a frictionless world, such 
negotiation presents no barrier to efficient outcomes.
28  In the real world of identity politics, 
however, it can create problematic power dynamics within a movement, some of which we will 
return to in Part II.  Nonetheless, in the hypothetical egalitarian society of Subpopulation Y, 
Groups 1–4 can be expected to succeed in enticing Group 5 to participate in the movement that 
maximizes the value of the collective action. 
                                                 
27 Cf. OLSON, supra note 19, at 35 (describing “a surprising tendency for the ‘exploitation’ of the great by the small” 
in organizations with unequal degrees of motivation among participants). 
28 See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  12 
Note, also, that a vast number of additional movements targeting some of the unfavorable 
laws could be conceived, but most are not included on the chart because no group would 
rationally partake in them.  One might think that a movement targeting laws v and q, for instance, 
would be a sensible, modest goal for Groups 4 and 5.  This might appear especially desirable if 
the other three groups were for some reason not willing or able to organize with Groups 4 and 5.  
But this movement would never get off the ground, as the cost to each group would be 7 units 
while the expected benefit would be only 3.6.  Of course, this disparity can be attributed in part 
to the assumption of large startup costs represented by the constant 6 in the cost formula, and this 
assumption may be incorrect.  But even if the cost formula is wildly inaccurate, it is 
uncontroversial that new identity-based movements face significant barriers to formation.
29  It 
follows that any number of human characteristics could form the basis of identity movements but 
for these costs, and that the current nonexistence of these movements does not indicate that they 
are not compelling or that they might not become valuable in the future if conditions change. 
In spite of its somewhat arbitrary assumptions (hereinafter referred to as the “PART I 
assumptions”), the chart thus makes a number of interesting suggestions about how social 
movements might work.  First and foremost, the analysis indicates that if different member 
groups have equal power within an organization, they will seek to maximize the value of the 
organization for the participants as a whole.  That is the case even though different participants 
in a movement derive different levels of benefit from the movement, even if that fact affects the 
internal dynamics of the movement.  This analysis also highlights the choice that some potential 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 19, at 22 (“[I]n virtually all cases [of collective political action] there will be 
significant initial or fixed costs.”); OESTREICHER, supra note 19, at 60–67 (describing the difficulty of building 
consensus among groups with competing interests); JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS 70–71 (2005) 
(describing the barriers to organization for a group of immigrant workers, many undocumented). REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  13 
members face between participation and free riding — or, to look instead at the silver lining, the 
beneficial positive externalities that social movements may sometimes bestow upon 
nonparticipants.
30  It also suggests (at least as an initial matter) that if probability of success 
increases as participation increases, and that if participants can share the costs of their joint 
effort, we should expect committed participants to be interested in increasing the size of the 
movement, not limiting it.  That they often strive to limit membership instead indicates that 
additional factors must be complicating these members’ motivations. 
 
I.B: The Optimal Size 
  Just as a social movement can optimize its agenda, we can also speak of a movement’s 
optimal size — the precise level of membership at which adding more participants would result 
in a decrease in overall value due to increased costs, decreased benefits, or both.  Of course, as 
the foregoing discussion suggests, it is conceivable that some social movements might have no 
optimal size at all, in that the more members join, the more value the movement can create, and 
that there is no limit to this principle.  Perhaps this idea is not so farfetched; after all (at least in 
the counterfactual world without social inequality) the government actors entrusted with making 
and changing the laws are politically accountable to all of their constituents.  It stands to reason 
that a government representative may be able to ignore a movement that has only a few 
members, but that the more her constituents identify with the movement, the more she will be 
forced to pay attention.  Similarly, important market actors may be unable to ignore a movement 
                                                 
30 Social movements can have negative externalities as well, of course.  In our example, individuals who currently 
benefit from laws m–q stand to incur losses if any of Subpopulation Y’s potential movements is successful. REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  14 
large enough to have an effect on their bottom lines.
31  Considering the high degree to which 
movement value grew as groups joined in the previous section’s model, it appears as though 
countervailing factors would have to be fairly compelling in order to outweigh this tendency.  
Several such factors may exist, however, and they are worth exploring. 
  One way in which increasing the size of a social movement might decrease its value is 
that as membership grows, movements may become more prone to inefficiencies.  There are a 
number of sources of inefficiency in organizations, and many of them tend to worsen as 
organizations increase in size.  For instance, large organizations often suffer from agency 
problems, in which individuals are entrusted with acting in the interest of the organization but 
instead act in their own interest or that of some other party.
32  And as a movement grows, it may 
also be forced to allocate an increasing portion of its resources to organizing and supporting the 
roles and contributions of its members, and it may exploit members’ resources and talents in a 
less productive manner.
33  
  Whereas the cost formula in the model displayed in the previous section assumed that the 
cost of a movement would grow only in proportion to the ambition of its agenda, the foregoing 
considerations suggest that costs might also increase in proportion to the number of members 
taking part in the movement.  However, as that model also portrayed, movements also tend to 
benefit greatly from increased membership: they are more likely to be successful, and as costs 
                                                 
31 Cf. GORDON, supra note 29, at 70 (lamenting that the 500-person membership of the Workplace Project did not 
“begin to approach the power needed to have significant impact in a labor market the size of Long Island’s”). 
32 See generally Susan P. Shapiro, Agency Theory, 31 ANN. REV. SOC. 263 (2005) (summarizing basic agency theory 
and reflecting on its merits). 
33 See, e.g., GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 92 (Kurt H. Wolff trans., 1950) (arguing that small 
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grow, participants can share them such that each member bears a lighter burden.  In order to 
outweigh these beneficial effects, costs would have to increase exponentially as movement 
participation grows.
34  Though the inefficiencies caused by growth in membership may be 
substantial, it seems very unlikely that they grow exponentially, at least as a systematic matter.  
One reason is simply that a number of very large movements exist, and many of these 
movements have enjoyed a great deal of success.  Millions of people participated in the Black 
Civil Rights Movement in the mid-twentieth century, and its structure was extremely complex.
35  
Currently, the LGBT Rights Movement is similar in its enormous membership and multifaceted 
structure.
36  These movements would not have grown to such a scale and achieved such great 
success if the costs of a large movement were truly prohibitive.  That organizational costs are 
sometimes prohibitive may simply indicate that some movements fail to organize in a way that 
can efficiently incorporate large-scale participation, though it would be in their interest to do so. 
  Even if growth in a movement necessarily raises costs such that they will eventually grow 
faster than benefits in proportion to new active members, this consideration does not necessary 
weigh in any absolute sense against inclusion of additional members over the efficient level.  
                                                 
34 Benefits grow exponentially as a movement grows because both the probability of success and the number of 
people benefiting from the movement’s success rise as a function of movement size.  Probability and the number of 
people benefiting are multiplied together to determine total social welfare.  Thus, in order to cancel out the increase 
as a function of group size on the benefits side of the equation, the costs side of the equation would need to feature 
that same variable raised to the power of two. 
35 See generally ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1984); Belinda Robnett, 
African-American Women in the Civil Rights Movement, 1954–1965: Gender, Leadership, and Micromobilization, 
101 AM. J. SOC. 1661 (1996). 
36 See generally DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD (1999). REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  16 
Newcomers can be allowed to play bit parts that require little guidance or organization: they can 
donate money, voice public support for the cause, or perform simple manual tasks like 
photocopying and hanging banners.  Alternatively, newcomers can start sister organizations in 
different regions or with different but complementary goals or strategies.  The possibility of 
inefficiencies therefore does not rule out growth beyond a fixed size.  At most, it weighs against 
a certain type of growth but leaves open other possibilities for expansion. 
  Increased membership in a social movement may also lead to one very specific type of 
cost increase: it may require participants to devote time and energy to internal policing that they 
would otherwise be able to devote directly to advancing the movement’s goals.  One of the most 
important sources of this need for internal policing is the collective action problem that 
inevitably arises from joint political activity.  In the seminal 1965 book The Logic of Collective 
Action, Professor Mancur Olson argues that when an organization like a social movement strives 
to produce a public good, individuals will not rationally participate unless they are somehow 
rewarded for doing so or punished for declining to do so.
37  Without some influential factor apart 
from the potential benefits they will enjoy if the movement is successful, individuals have no 
incentive to actively participate rather than simply taking a free ride — reaping the benefits of 
the movement’s achievements without sharing in its costs.
38  Professor Olson argues that these 
collective action costs increase as an organization grows
39 and that large organizations must 
devise some way to account for them in order to thrive.
40  Subsequent scholars have modified the 
                                                 
37 OLSON, supra note 19, at 15–16; see also GORDON, supra note 29, at 114 (describing the free-rider problems that 
interfered with individual incentives to participate in the Workplace Project). 
38 OLSON, supra note 19, at 12–13, 21. 
39 See id. at 53. 
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work’s conclusions and expanded on the ways in which large groups might curtail collective 
action problems.
41 
  Professor Olson’s thesis, however, does not actually explain exclusionary behavior.  To 
the contrary, it demonstrates that if a movement has expansive goals, it requires many active 
members, and that providing benefits to non-contributors is counterproductive.  When a 
movement rejects willing participants, it exacerbates its free-rider problem, as these individuals 
will presumably still benefit from the movement’s achievements, but they will not have been 
permitted to contribute toward those achievements, thus raising costs for members.  Put 
differently, Olson’s account assumes that an individual’s incentive is to reap the benefits of 
collective action without participating and that an organization’s incentive is to induce individual 
participation.
42  Exclusionary behavior inverts this relationship and thus appears plainly irrational 
under Olson’s assumptions.  Moreover, it stands to reason that inactive participation may still be 
better than no participation at all.  Individuals who identify with a movement but do not actually 
take part in its political activities are still likely to vote with the movement and take other passive 
but marginally helpful actions.  Attempts to prevent these individuals from identifying with the 
movement at all could potentially backfire, as these individuals could become bitter and actually 
take actions against their own interests in order to retaliate. 
  Finally, some movements may wish to limit participation in order to prevent new 
members from shifting the movement’s agenda.  In the model from the previous section, for 
example, Groups 1, 2, and 3 are interested in changing laws o, p, and q.  Suppose that they form 
                                                 
41 See generally Lars Udéhn, Twenty-Five Years with “The Logic of Collective Action,” 36 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 239 
(1993).  Many of these scholars have challenged Olson’s conclusion that the organization characteristics that cause 
collective action problems are necessarily correlated with an organization’s size.  Id. at 241. 
42 See OLSON, supra note 19, at 37. REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  18 
a social movement in order to change all three of these laws, but that law o imposes the most 
significant burden on them and is therefore their highest priority.  Suppose, also, that Group 4 
has expressed interest in joining their movement.  Group 4 does not share the other groups’ 
interest in changing law o, but only in changing laws p and q.  Thus, if it takes part in the 
movement, Group 4 can be expected to pursue changes to laws p and q more vigorously than it 
pursues changes to law o.  Under the PART I assumptions, this is not a problem: Group 4’s 
efforts will not detract from those of Groups 1, 2, and 3, and the original groups will obtain some 
benefit from those efforts, even if these benefits are less valuable to them.  Initially, there is no 
reason to assume that the movement’s agenda cannot simply grow as membership grows. 
However, a few variations on the PART I assumptions may make Group 4’s differing set 
of interests more problematic for the original three groups.  One potential problem could arise if 
the potential new members are not merely indifferent to changes in law o, but are affirmatively 
opposed to such changes.  Then, Groups 1, 2, and 3 might fear that while working toward 
changes in laws p and q, the members of Group 4 will simultaneously attempt to undermine their 
efforts to change law o.  Similarly, Groups 1, 2, and 3 might fear that although Group 4 claims to 
be interested in changing law o, its members are in fact interested in joining the movement only 
in order to sabotage it from within.
43 
Although these scenarios are certainly troublesome, whether they represent realistic 
threats is another matter.
44  Most accounts suggest that opponents of social movements are more 
                                                 
43 See Gary T. Marx, Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant: The Agent Provocateur 
and the Informant, 80 AM. J. SOC. 402, 403 (1974). 
44 To be sure, different groups within an identity community do sometimes have interests that are at odds.  
Commentators have observed, for instance, that although Black women would likely benefit from a dialogue about 
domestic violence within the Black community, this dialogue is silenced due to fears that it will reinforce the REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  19 
likely to work against them from the outside than to attempt to infiltrate them.
45  Defending the 
status quo is generally understood to be easier than changing it, and as such, the channels 
through which opponents of a social movement can work are more plentiful and accessible than 
the channels through which the movement itself can operate.
46  The sabotage strategy limits 
these opponents to the more expensive channels to which the movement is restricted.  That 
strategy thereby converts what would be an advantageous situation for the opponent of the 
movement into a competition of equals.  And even if such infiltration does sometimes occur, it is 
likely too unusual and well disguised to justify significant efforts on the part of the movement to 
police its membership for the occasional mole. 
A perhaps more realistic impulse to limit social movement participation might arise if 
Groups 1, 2, and 3 believe that there is a limited pool of available benefits, such that if changing 
law o is their highest priority, it is actually important to prevent changes in laws p and q.  
Assume, for example, that the only way laws o, p, and q can be changed is through legislation, 
and that the relevant legislature has committed to only reconsider one of the three laws over the 
next five years.  If changing law o is the most valuable goal for Groups 1, 2, and 3, they might 
                                                                                                                                                           
stereotype that Black men are violent.  See Crenshaw, supra note 10, at 1252–53.  But it is important not to conflate 
community with movement: the individuals who oppose discussions about domestic violence are unlikely to join an 
organization devoted to advancing Black feminism, and vice versa, even though both groups might be considered 
part of the Black community. 
45 See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights: Parents, the State, and Proposition 8, 5 STAN. J. 
C.R. & C.L. 357, 359 (2009) (discussing the tactics of the campaign supporting Proposition 8, which outlawed 
same-sex marriage in California). 
46 See generally Emily Brissette & Mike King, Overcoming Internal Pacification, in WE ARE MANY 193 (2012) 
(discussing the many ways in which even a very undesirable status quo can be maintained).  REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  20 
wish to focus their energies exclusively on law o and even oppose changes to p and q.  In this 
case, including Group 4 in the movement would be counterproductive for the other three groups; 
despite appearances to the contrary, their interests are at odds. 
  Such hard limits on legal change would be highly unusual, of course, but members of a 
social movement often have reason to believe that, as a practical matter, their cumulative efforts 
will have diminishing returns.  They may decide to limit participation based on a belief that such 
limitation is the best way to get a limited pool of benefits distributed to the neediest or most 
deserving beneficiaries.  Another variation on this theme that is especially prominent in the 
identity-movement context is the idea that the general public’s patience for progressive ideas, 
though not a quantifiable good as such, is in some ways limited.  Separate, sequential movements 
— and separate, sequential strands of the same movement — have a complex relationship.  
Although in some situations, the achievements of a previous movement can lay the groundwork 
for a successor, at other times, some have theorized that the earlier movements have instead 
fatigued the public’s attention span and caused society to be less receptive to the successor’s 
efforts.
47 
  But again, the story is more complicated, as attempts to limit the size of a movement in 
order to allocate scarce resources efficiently can backfire.  Introducing the concept of boundaries 
                                                 
47 See BAGENSTOS, supra note 19, at 28 (hypothesizing that the successes of the Civil Rights Movement during the 
1970s caused the public to be less receptive to the efforts of the Disability Rights Movement in the 1980s).  In 
another example, suffrage activist Elizabeth Cady Stanton, writing about the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, 
which guaranteed the right to vote regardless of race but not regardless of sex, stated: 
[T]he very elect were in favor of negro suffrage first, woman suffrage afterwards, which meant the 
postponement of the latter question for another generation.  The few who had the prescience to see 
the long years of apathy that always follow a great conflict, strained every nerve to settle the broad 
question of suffrage on its true basis while the people were awake to its importance . . . . 
 
ELIZABETH CADY STANTON ET AL., HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, VOL. II 367–68 (1881). 
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to an identity movement has reverberating effects that may ultimately harm the very individuals 
who first promoted it.  That is because at some point, the determination of membership will 
likely fall into the hands of an outsider, such as a legislator or a judge, putting insiders’ own 
access to benefits at risk.  In the Disability Rights Movement context, for instance, many early 
proponents of disability rights laws favored narrow protection in order to conserve resources for 
the neediest in the disability community.
48  Later, those same advocates were unhappy when 
judges interpreted the statutory definition of disability more narrowly than they had envisioned.
49  
There is also an idea among some that by drawing bright lines between members and 
nonmembers, boundary policing can serve to essentialize the identity trait, thereby reinforcing 
the very harmful stereotypes that the movement may intend to challenge.
50 
  At best, excluding individuals from a movement out of fear that they will hijack its 
agenda appears to have uncertain rewards.  It is frequently unclear to what extent resources are 
actually limited; the successful achievement of one goal might open doors for the second goal 
rather than closing them, a consideration that weighs against strict prioritization.  And pursuing 
multiple goals at the same time may be a good technique for “diversifying” a movement’s risk.
51  
After all, in the real world, the chance that any given political goal can be achieved is often 
extraordinarily uncertain.  In light of this uncertainty, it seems quite reckless to alienate 
                                                 
48 See BAGENSTOS, supra note 19, at 20–21. 
49 See id. at 46–47. 
50 See id. at 49–51.  To be sure, this argument may prove too much, undermining the entire enterprise of identity-
based politics.  See Crenshaw, supra note 10, at 1242 (describing identity-based politics as “in tension with 
dominant conceptions of social justice”).  
51 Cf. ROBERT L. HAGIN, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 44 (2004) (discussing diversification of stock market 
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presumptive allies on the basis of relatively minor disagreements.  And finally, excluding these 
potential new members provides no guarantee that they will not simply form a separate 
movement and continue to compete for the same limited pool of resources through similar 
strategies and channels.  Inclusion in the original movement at least presents the opportunity of 
monitoring the newcomers’ actions and attempting to persuade them that the original goals are 
important and worthwhile. 
  Thus, if social movements function in a manner roughly resembling the model from the 
previous section, exclusionary behavior is difficult to understand.  Although growth in an 
organization may sometimes lead to inefficiencies, these efficiencies seem unlikely to ever 
outweigh the advantages a movement gains from increasing its membership.  Moreover, when a 
movement seeks to provide a public good, individual rational actors have an incentive to free 
ride rather than participate, and organizations must generally take affirmative strides to curb this 
tendency.  In light of these considerations, actively excluding willing participants appears not 
just unnecessary, but counter to the interests of the organization.  Nor does the idea of a limited 
pool of benefits seem like a promising explanation of most exclusionary behavior.  Thus, 
although most people probably imagine that social movements function in a manner that 
approximately reflects the PART I assumptions, it appears that a good deal of individual behavior 
is at odds with that model.  Perhaps psychological or philosophical theories really do account for 
this behavior.  Or perhaps, instead, the incongruities explored in the foregoing discussion 
indicate that identity movements do not in fact function as the model assumes. 
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PART II: The Effects of Social Inequalities on the Identity Movements that Seek to Change Them 
  The entire premise of PART I — that social movements operate in a world devoid of 
social hierarchies — is, of course, false.  The existence of socially differentiated groups, and the 
dominance of some of those groups over others, is likely as old as human history.
52  In essence, 
dominant groups are distinguished by their possession of a disproportionately large share of 
positive social value, both material and symbolic.
53  This system of unequal power is reinforced 
through individual discrimination, legal and institutional discrimination, culturally embedded 
myths, and individual internalization of societal roles.
54  Although the axes of social domination 
and oppression have varied historically and geographically and may even be unlimited,
55 a 
number of particularly well-documented systems are widely recognized in the modern era by 
their “isms”: racism,
56 sexism,
57 classism,
58 heterosexism,
59 and ableism.
60  The law plays a 
                                                 
52 See JIM SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE 38 (1999) (“Most forms of group conflict and 
oppression (e.g., racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, nationalism, classism, regionalism) can be regarded as different 
manifestations of the same basic human predisposition to form group-based social hierarchies.”). 
53 See generally Deana A. Rohlinger, Privilege, in BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY (2007); Pierre 
Bourdieu, Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction, in KNOWLEDGE, EDUCATION, AND CULTURAL CHANGE 
71 (1973) (introducing the concept of “cultural capital”).  
54 See SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 52, at 39–49 (providing an overview of the instrumentalities through which 
social inequality is preserved); PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 277–288 (2d ed. 2000) 
(categorizing the many methods dominant groups employ to maintain their status as structural, disciplinary, 
hegemonic, and interpersonal).  
55 See SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 52, at 38. 
56 See Pierre L. van den Berghe, Racism, in BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY (2007). 
57 See Amy Lind, Sexism, in BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY (2007). 
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powerful role not only in entrenching these systems of oppression but also, frequently, in 
counteracting them.
61 
  Social hierarchies and their effects permeate human action, so it stands to reason that all 
social movements are in some way affected by them.
62  But as phenomena that are defined by 
social inequality and that seek to change the patterns of benefits and burdens that flow from it, 
identity movements are uniquely situated within our system of social hierarchies.  Rather than 
being organized around the contextual interests of their participants, these movements are 
predicated on personal characteristics that form a part of the members’ identities.  These 
characteristics are themselves invested with different levels of practical and symbolic value.
63  
Identity movements, at the same time as they fight against the system of valued identities, are 
forced to trade in those same identity-based currencies.  The remainder of this paper explores the 
effects that this inevitable philosophical dissonance has on movement dynamics. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
59 See Barry D. Adam, Homophobia and Heterosexism, in BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY (2007). 
60 See FIONA KUMARI CAMPBELL, CONTOURS OF ABLEISM 5 (2009); see also MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN 
PREJUDICE 21–22 (2000) (referring to discrimination against individuals with mental and psychological disabilities 
as “sanism”). 
61 See COLLINS, supra note 54, at 277–80. 
62 An analysis of the effects of social inequalities on social movements writ large is outside the scope of this paper.  
However, it seems likely that its conclusions apply to many social movements that do not fit the definition of 
identity movements.  For example, some commentators have observed that the Occupy Wall Street movement has 
privileged white, middle-class perspectives.  See, e.g., Joel Olson, Whiteness and the 99%, in WE ARE MANY 46, 
46–47 (2012). 
63 See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Racial Capital, 126 HARV. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 8–25) 
(summarizing literature that conceptualizes racial identities as possessing economic, legal, or cultural value).  REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  25 
II.A: Replication 
As commentators in the fields of law and sociology have frequently lamented, in spite of 
the strides identity movements have made in bringing about greater social equality, these 
achievements have repeatedly failed to address the cross-cutting statuses of their participants and 
the ways in which internal inequalities might affect the dynamics of identity groups.  Professor 
Patricia Hill Collins has coined the phrase “matrix of domination” to capture the compounding 
effects of the various types of social inequality on individuals who identify with multiple 
oppressed groups.
64  Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw has highlighted the tendency of identity 
movements to marginalize the experiences of those participants who, as she puts it, exist at the 
“intersectionalities” of race, gender, and other axes of inequality.
65  But scholars have not yet 
proposed a theory for how these internal inequalities come into being in the first place.  This 
paper introduces the concept of replication: the process by which, rather than seeking to 
maximize its value for all participants, a movement adopts mainstream values and hierarchies in 
all respects that are unrelated to the identity characteristic around which it is organized. 
The existence of differently situated participants within an identity movement might itself 
distort the movement’s agenda as compared with the optimal agenda theorized in PART I of this 
paper.  The higher an individual’s status in mainstream social hierarchies, the greater her ability 
to effect social and legal change.  Privileged individuals have easier access to courtrooms, 
                                                 
64 See COLLINS, supra note 54, at 227–28. 
65 See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140; Crenshaw, 
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statehouses, and boardrooms.
66  They are more likely to have personal connections to powerful 
decisionmakers.
67  They are more likely to have the means to fund ambitious reform 
campaigns.
68  They have a disproportionately large influence on their elected representatives.
69  
They are often better able to craft their arguments in ways that appeal to mainstream 
sensibilities.
70  They suffer fewer day-to-day pressures and are therefore able to devote more 
time and energy to the movement.
71  They will likely experience less retaliation for acts of civil 
                                                 
66 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This Much Injustice?, 75 Mo. 
L. Rev. 683, 683–84 (2010) (discussing disparities in attorney representation); Michael B. Dorff, Confident 
Uncertainty, Excessive Compensation and the Obama Plan, 85 IND. L.J. 491, 522 (“The upper echelons of the 
corporate world are remarkably homogeneous.  Board members and senior executives in Fortune 500 companies are 
overwhelmingly white and male.”). 
67 See, e.g., WOODS, supra note 19, at 3 n.3. 
68 For example, race and gender are strongly correlated with income.  See Table 701: Median Income of People in 
Constant (2009) Dollars by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1990 to 2009, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0701.pdf (last visited December 7, 2012). 
69 See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY 253–54 (2008) (using data on Senate voting patterns to 
demonstrate that elected officials are far more responsive to wealthy constituents than to those of “modest means”). 
70 Cf. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1367 (1988) (“People can only demand change in ways that 
reflect the logic of the institutions that they are challenging.  Demands for change that do not reflect the institutional 
logic–that is, demands that do not engage and subsequently reinforce the dominant ideology–will probably be 
ineffective.”). 
71 See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project, and the 
Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 431 (1995) (stating that women were less involved in 
the Workplace Project in part because they “carry the double load of working outside the home and keeping the 
family together, leaving them too exhausted to take on other responsibilities.”).  REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  27 
disobedience.
72  And because members of oppressed identity groups are themselves not immune 
to the pervasive influences of social inequality, the groups themselves are likely to place the 
greatest value on the contributions of the most privileged participants, even if subconsciously.  
For these and myriad other reasons, the participants of an identity movement who otherwise 
identify with privileged social groups have on average a disproportionate influence on the 
movement’s agenda. 
Imagine returning to Subpopulation Y, but with a few changes that represent the effects of 
social hierarchies on the organization of potential movements.  Groups 1–5 still have a variety of 
interests, some overlapping, that are affected by laws m–v.  But now, instead of interest k, Group 
5 has an “x factor”: a special characteristic that gives its members unique access to the channels 
of legal change. 
Subpopulation Y 
Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  Group 5 
a (m) 
b (n) 
c (o) 
d (p) 
e (q) 
f (r) 
g (s) 
c (o) 
d (p) 
e (q) 
h (t) 
i (u) 
c (o) 
d (p) 
e (q) 
h (t) 
b (n) 
j (v) 
d (p) 
e (q) 
x 
a (m) 
i (u) 
j (v) 
e (q) 
In PART I’s model, the probability of success of a movement was a function of the number of 
groups participating.  Here, in contrast, because of Group 5’s special characteristic x, suppose 
that the only factor that affects the probability of a movement’s success is whether or not Group 
5 participates.  If it does, the movement will gain access to the instrumentalities of change and 
will therefore have an 80% chance of achieving its goals.  If it does not, the other groups may 
still form a movement, but they will be confined to highly suboptimal strategies, so their 
probability of success will be only 20%. 
                                                 
72 See GORDON, supra note 29, at 89 (citing fear of deportation and other retaliation as one factor that makes 
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  In all other ways, costs and benefits are calculated as before.  With only this single 
change from the default assumptions in PART I, the landscape of potential movements changes 
dramatically, as depicted in the chart below: 
 Cost, Benefits, and Social Utility of Potential Movements 
Laws targeted 
for change 
Net Benefits for 
Group 5 
Net Benefits for 
Groups 1–4 
Total Net 
Benefits 
Total Social 
Utility 
q only  1.2  4.8 (1.2 each)  6  6 
v and q 
(results for u and 
q similar) 
3.6  4.8 (3.6 for 
Group 4; .4 for 
Groups 1–3) 
8.4  8.4 
m, u, v, and q  7.3  2.7 (.9 for 
Groups 1, 3, and 
4; Group 2 will 
not participate) 
10  13.2 (Group 2 
benefits from 
public good) 
n, o, p, and q  Group 5 will not 
participate, as 
costs outweigh 
benefits. 
Groups 1 – 4 will 
also not 
participate, as 
costs outweigh 
benefits once the 
probability of 
success is 
adjusted to 20%. 
0  0 
m, n, o, p, and q  1.2  24 (10.8 for 
Group 1; 4.4 for 
Groups 2 – 4) 
23.2  23.2 
Unlike under the assumptions in PART I, the movement that maximizes value to all participants 
is no longer the movement that is most likely to actually occur.  That is because the other groups 
are dependent on Group 5 for the success of the movement, so Group 5 enjoys disproportionate 
bargaining power.  Whereas Group 5’s refusal to participate would devastate the movement, no 
other group possesses that degree of leverage, as a movement could function without their 
participation, and their contributions are essentially fungible.  This situation tends to favor 
movements that are optimal for Group 5, while they need only be marginally worthy of 
investment for the other groups.  Thus, even though a movement targeting laws m, n, o, p, and q 
would maximize value for Subpopulation Y as a whole, a movement targeting laws m, u, v, and q REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  29 
is more likely to materialize.  It is also worth noting that a movement targeting laws n, o, p, and 
q, which conferred the second-greatest benefits on its participants under the PART I assumptions, 
would never even get off the ground under the assumptions of this Part. 
A potential objection to these conclusions is: why cannot Groups 1–4 simply pool their 
resources and pay Group 5 the difference between the value it would derive from movement m-
u-v-q and the value it would derive from movement m-n-o-p-q in exchange for its participation in 
the latter movement, thereby obtaining the socially optimal outcome?  This strategy would be 
very risky for Groups 1–4.  Whereas under the PART I assumptions, participating groups worked 
toward the movement’s goals in a completely collaborative manner, here Group 5 alone is 
entrusted with communicating the movement’s message to the public or to lawmakers.  In other 
words, it serves as an agent of the movement as a whole.
73  Any delegation runs the risk that the 
agent will shirk her duty, but that concern is especially prevalent where, as here, it is difficult for 
the principle to measure performance and discipline shirking, and where the agent’s own 
preferences are out of alignment with the principal’s preferences.
74  There is a great risk that 
after signing on to promote the m-n-o-p-q agenda and accepting the contributions of Groups 1–4, 
Group 5 will use the movement’s resources to promote the m-u-v-q agenda instead.  For one 
thing, Group 5 can advocate changes in laws m and q zealously while devoting to laws n, o, and 
p only the bare minimum effort necessary to appease the other groups.  It can then secretly divert 
movement resources to a nominally separate effort to change laws u and v.  This behavior would 
be quite difficult for Groups 1–4 to police.  And even if Groups 1–4 are aware of Group 5’s 
shirking, because of their bargaining disadvantages, they have little ability to discipline Group 5 
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without inflicting collateral harm on the movement.  Thus, although we will return to the 
possibility of induced participation in PART III, it is unlikely to be fruitful in the run of cases. 
This explanation for Group 5’s disproportionate influence on the movement’s agenda 
relies only on the privileged access to the instruments of legal change that Group 5 enjoys 
outside the movement.  In real identity movements, to the extent that participants have 
internalized mainstream social hierarchies, such favored groups also benefit from privileged 
social status within the subpopulation in which the movement originates.  Commentators have 
observed, for example, that the Black community has historically accorded greater social status 
to men than to women,
75 to heterosexuals than to LGBT individuals,
76 and sometimes to 
working- to upper-class Blacks than to very poor Blacks,
77 even outside the context of political 
activity.  Observations of the LGBT community
78 and other minority communities
79 echo these 
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same themes.  Thus, because most movement participants (like most individuals in the general 
population) are predisposed to overvalue the contributions of members who belong to socially 
privileged groups and undervalue the contributions of the less privileged, they are even more 
likely to accede to the demands of the privileged participants than they would be as a pure result 
of the clout that those participants enjoy outside the movement. 
It is important to note, of course, that in spite of Group 5’s dramatic increase in leverage 
under the assumptions of this model, it is still dependent on the collective power of the other 
groups.  Group 5 cannot “go it alone”: although it has special access to the instrumentalities of 
legal reform, the cost of independently mounting a campaign against even a single law would 
outweigh the benefits it might derive from such a change.  It thus depends on the pooling of 
resources from Groups 1–4, just as the movements in PART I depended on a cost-sharing 
arrangement and quasi-contractual agreements to achieve their objectives.  As such, Group 5 is 
still at least to some extent beholden to the wishes of Groups 1–4.  But the dependency 
relationship, though mutual, is very asymmetric in Group 5’s favor.  Unless Groups 1–4 have 
another powerful ally who can take up their cause, Group 5 can probably stray quite far from 
those wishes without losing their funding and support. 
These conclusions would likely come as little surprise to people who have been involved 
in progressive identity movements.  Firsthand accounts of these movements abound with 
examples of the most socially privileged members’ overwhelming domination of the 
movement’s agenda and, by extension, its accomplishments.  For example, several commentators 
have expounded on the tendency of the Civil Rights Movement and its modern offshoots to 
promote the interests of Black men at the expense of Black women and other more marginalized 
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have typically required Black women to subordinate their own needs to the needs of Black men, 
ostensibly for the good of the community.
80  In part due to this myopic tendency of progressive 
race politics, the antidiscrimination regime introduced in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964
81 does not acknowledge the intersecting forces of race- and gender-based prejudice on 
African American women.
82 
Others have pointed out that Title VII can only do so much to improve the economic 
conditions of racial and ethnic minorities and women.  For instance, the law’s bar on 
discrimination in employment only applies to individuals who have a job to lose or who are 
qualified for a job they seek, which often requires education that is unavailable to the poor.
83  
Thus, the Civil Rights Act has likely helped middle- and upper-class minorities and women gain 
and maintain professional status but is limited in its ability to help poor minorities and women.  
A similar critique applies to disability rights laws like the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990.
84  Because these laws only recognize discrimination that is strictly based on disability, they 
do not require reasonable accommodations for needs that result from intersecting minority 
statuses, like disability and socioeconomic status.  Several courts have held, for instance, that a 
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landlord is not required to make an exception to an income requirement as an accommodation for 
a prospective tenant who cannot work due to a disability, as the tenant’s lack of income is a 
condition of her socioeconomic status rather than her disability.
85 
Critiques of the LGBT Rights Movement have struck a very similar chord, often drawing 
from these earlier accounts of the privilege-oriented agendas of the Civil Rights and Women’s 
Movements.
86  In particular, commentators have argued that the Movement’s narrow focus on 
legalization of same-sex marriage is skewed in favor of white, male, upper-class interests.
87  In 
particular, they argue (with empirical support) that white and upper-class gay people are more 
likely than minority and poor gay people to take advantage of marriage rights.
88  Furthermore, 
some contend that embracing marriage as an end in itself further marginalizes single people, 
single parents, and individuals in alternative family units, categories that disproportionately 
encompass the poor, racial and ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, and other historically 
marginalized groups.
89  And a feminist variation on this critique asserts that wholesale 
endorsement of the marriage agenda ignores the historical use of the institution of marriage to 
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subordinate women.
90  In spite of these internal reservations, same-sex marriage has come to 
overwhelmingly dominate the LGBT agenda.
91 
As these and other examples amply demonstrate, in spite of their progressive, equality-
driven objectives, identity movements tend to replicate the values and hierarchies of mainstream 
society.  And this tendency toward replication is likely a product both of the bargaining leverage 
that privileged participants gain by occupying a higher status in the mainstream culture and of 
the direct influence of mainstream hierarchies on the views of movement participants.  By taking 
advantage of the social status they enjoy both outside and within the movement, the most 
privileged members of otherwise oppressed groups are able to control the movement’s agenda 
without losing the support of the other participants. 
It is important to emphasize that this analysis provides an explanation, not a justification, 
for the phenomenon of replication.  In contrast, many observers of identity movements have 
instead offered a justification: crafting an agenda that challenges the mainstream status quo as 
little as possible is the most pragmatic strategy for bringing about incremental change.
92  Put 
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differently, they contend that it is the content of the message, rather than the identity of the 
message’s bearer, that accounts for the selection of identity-based campaigns that 
disproportionately benefit the most privileged members of minority communities.  So far, the 
models analyzed in this paper have assumed that the costs of waging identity-based campaigns 
would vary only as a function of the extent to which the movement seeks to change the law, and 
not based on the content of those changes.  Clearly, this is an oversimplification, as lawmakers 
and the general public are more resistant to some changes than to others.  Perhaps, then, as the 
pragmatic justification implies, the legal changes that disproportionately benefit privileged 
groups are less costly than those that benefit less privileged groups.  Under this reasoning, the 
skew of the movement’s agenda, far from the inefficiency it is portrayed as here, is actually 
engineered to maximize benefits and minimize costs. 
But this reasoning is suspect for a number of reasons.  It assumes that changes to the law 
that would benefit less privileged members of identity groups are inherently more radical and 
less likely to gain public approval than those that benefit more privileged members.  But the 
opposite may in fact be true, especially if the movement has been active for some time.  Once a 
movement has achieved a number of victories on behalf of its most privileged members, further 
advances of a similar type may become increasingly hard won.  The general public may be more 
likely to see additional demands beyond some threshold level as representing excessive or 
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“special” rights.
93  But for more marginalized members of the movement, significant initial 
improvements are yet to be made, so there may still be low-hanging fruit.
94  And on the benefits 
side of the equation, these marginalized members of the movement may possess so little social 
and cultural capital that they value incremental improvements in their quality of life much more 
than the privileged members would value those same improvements.
95 
At times, there may be merit to social movement leaders’ assertions that targeting laws 
that disadvantage the least privileged participants is not politically feasible.  But it is in part 
because these arguments are sometimes apt that they are so effective in quelling the internal 
conflict that might otherwise force the privileged groups to be more accountable to their less 
privileged constituents.  Thus, it seems unlikely that pragmatism explains replication, at least in 
its entirety.  Instead, much of the time, pragmatic rhetoric may be a powerful tool to reinforce 
replication when movement participants challenge it. 
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II.B: Purification 
  The foregoing account of identity movement dynamics does not in itself explain the 
exclusionary behaviors that many movement participants exhibit.  Although commentators 
frequently speak of less privileged individuals’ being “excluded” from identity movements, they 
are generally referring to a tendency to devalue or ignore these individuals’ perspectives and 
experiences rather than rejecting their valuable contributions.  It is not typically questioned, for 
instance, whether African American women actually belong in the Civil Rights and Women’s 
Movements.  It is just that because they lack social and political power, these movements need 
not be more than minimally accountable to them.  Far from discouraging their participation, it 
takes their participation for granted. 
Meanwhile, actual exclusion exists in many forms.  Some middle- and upper-class 
African Americans have described feeling rejected by the Civil Rights Movement and its 
offshoots as a result of their socioeconomic status.
96  Members of the Disability Rights 
Movement have expressed suspicion toward individuals with mild or invisible disabilities who 
seek movement involvement.
97  The LGBT Rights Movement has historically been unwelcoming 
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toward bisexuals.
98  As we have seen, feminism-based movements have frequently shunned 
transgender women.  These examples do not fall neatly into the replication paradigm: here, the 
individuals who are being rejected from a movement with which they purport to identify do not 
necessarily occupy a lower social status than those rejecting them.  Instead, their interests 
diverge in some significant way, despite substantial overlap, from the set of interests that the 
movement’s established agenda assumes.  That divergence allows established members to allege 
that the newcomers do not authentically represent the community that the movement purports to 
champion.  This phenomenon can be termed purification: the process by which a movement 
idealizes a set of personal characteristics that movement participants are expected to embody, 
and rejects potential members who do not exhibit those characteristics. 
Once again, from the standpoint of the PART I model, purification makes little sense.  
Even if it is true that these potential members’ interests are not perfectly aligned with those of 
established members, their substantial overlap in interests would make it mutually beneficial to 
join in concerted action.  After all, social movement participants never have perfect uniformity of 
interests.  And given the incentives that individuals generally have to free ride a movement rather 
than to participate actively, it seems odd that the established members would turn down eager 
contributions from potential new members.  But understood from the perspective of the PART II 
model, in which preexisting social inequalities determine the dynamics of identity movements, 
purification may well accord with established members’ self-interest.  Because non-privileged 
movement participants do not have access to the channels of legal change, they have little direct 
influence on the movement’s agenda.  They therefore must seek alternative strategies for 
promoting their self-interest in the context of the movement.  Often, this means asserting indirect 
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influence, such as by preventing changes in the movement’s membership that might affect the 
agenda in a manner adverse to these participants’ interests. 
Returning to the PART II model, in which Group 5 possesses a special x factor that 
allows it to be an ambassador between the movement and mainstream society, imagine that 
Groups 1, 3, 4, and 5 have agreed to form a movement that will advocate for changes in laws m, 
u, v, and q.  Imagine one further wrinkle, in that the groups are now differently situated in the 
amount of value they will derive from changes in the various laws, as the chart below depicts: 
Value Each Group Places on Changes in a Law 
Law  Group 1  Group 3  Group 4  Group 5 
m  4 units  0  0  4 units 
u  0  2 units  0  4 units 
v  0  0  2 units  4 units 
q  4 units  6 units  6 units  4 units 
As a concession to Groups 1, 3, and 4, who know that their interests could be better served by a 
different agenda – and especially to Groups 3 and 4, who value changes to law q especially 
highly – Group 5 has agreed to prioritize law q.  Only so many individuals belong to Group 5, 
after all, so no matter how many resources the movement compiles, Group 5 will only be able to 
pursue one reform at a time.  Groups 1, 3, and 4 may be somewhat concerned that Group 5 will 
shirk, but since Group 5 would derive equal value from changes to any of the four laws, they 
believe that the small degree of accountability Group 5 owes them will be sufficient to keep 
Group 5 compliant with the agreed-upon agenda.  The compromise is tenuous but promising. 
Now imagine that a new group, Group 6, enters the scene, and that Group 6 is not 
affected by law q but would derive six units of value from changes to law m.  Group 1, naturally, 
would be perfectly happy to allow Group 6 to join the movement, but Groups 3 and 4 are 
adamantly opposed.  If Group 6 joins, it may try to persuade Group 5 to shift its focus toward 
changing law m, which would divert the movement’s resources and disadvantage Groups 3 and REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  40 
4.  Groups 3 and 4 have very little influence over Group 5, but what influence they do have they 
must guard jealously, or else they may find themselves funding a movement that does not 
represent their interests at all.  By allowing Group 6 to enter the movement, they would consent 
to a reduction of their intra-movement power.  Instead of comprising two-thirds of the population 
to which Group 6 is accountable, they would comprise only one-half.  And allowing Group 6 to 
join now will make it more likely that more new groups with disparate interests will join in the 
future, thereby further diluting the influence of Groups 3 and 4.  Thus, even though Group 6’s 
ability to share in the costs of the movement might benefit Groups 3 and 4 in the immediate 
future, they cannot take the longer-term risk of allowing the movement’s agenda to fall 
completely out of their hands. 
In contrast, if a new group that shared the interests of Groups 3 and 4 joined — say, a 
group that was only interested in changing law q — Groups 3 and 4 would welcome its 
participation.  First of all, that new group would reinforce their influence within the movement 
rather than diluting it, as the groups that favor prioritization of law q would rise from two-thirds 
to three-fourths of the movement population.  Second, the entrance of this sympathetic group 
would reduce the costs of Groups 3 and 4 in two ways: the new group would share in the overall 
costs of the movement, and it would also share in the costs of keeping groups with divergent 
interests out once it has established its membership.  As this scenario illustrates, it is not their 
personal influence over Group 5 that the members of Groups 3 and 4 must defend.  It is the 
primacy of their set of interests, which in identity movements are individual characteristics.  
Thus, it is in established members’ interest to scrutinize carefully whether potential new 
members are like them, and to do everything within their power to exclude potential new 
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In essence, introducing social inequality into this system has converted what could have 
been a mutually value-maximizing enterprise into a zero-sum game.  It makes movement 
participants’ fear of a hard limit to the progress that the movement can achieve
99 into a reality.  
But the limit does not emerge from mainstream society and its resistance to change, at least not 
directly.  Instead, the progress of a movement is restricted by its reliance on the actions of the 
most privileged members to bring about the changes that the movement seeks. The number of 
movement participants with access to the instrumentalities of legal change is finite, and these 
participants are therefore limited in the amount of change they can effect.  Thus, the limits to 
movement achievement are internal rather than external.  Meanwhile, non-privileged members of 
the movement can invest their resources and energy into providing support to the privileged 
members, but these efforts will have diminishing returns.  At some point, efforts devoted to 
purifying the membership of the movement become more likely to bear rewards.  These efforts 
may create a culture of conformity within the movement that punishes even established members 
for deviating from the majority viewpoint.
100 
The language of authenticity serves a useful function for the movement participants who 
take part in purification.  Much like replicators’ use of the language of pragmatism, it provides 
them with a philosophical justification for behavior that could otherwise be seen as morally 
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objectionable.  One study of dynamics within the Black community,
101 for instance, documents 
how middle class African Americans are sometimes accused of not being “Black enough”
102 by 
others of their race based on their style of speech,
103 style of dress,
104 place of residence,
105  taste 
in music,
106 or social involvement with Whites.
107  Professor Patricia Hill Collins has even 
theorized that homophobia within the Black community is in part rooted in the notion that 
departure from heterosexuality is a White phenomenon, so LGBT Black people are “less 
authentically Black.”
108  Meanwhile, many members of the LGBT Rights Movement justify their 
rejection of bisexuals in terms that resonate with the “Black enough” language of exclusion in 
the Civil Rights Context.
109  The logic implicit in this hostility is that these individuals are 
inadequate representatives of the minority group to which they seek alliance by virtue of not 
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having suffered at the hands of the mainstream culture as much or in the same way as established 
members.  Depending on the context, these individuals at the margins of identity boundaries are 
either seen as “faking” their identity-group affiliation
110 or as trying to “pass” in mainstream 
culture to the detriment of the movement.
111 
Somewhat ironically, this language of authenticity occasionally purports to reject 
potential new members on the basis of the societal privilege they enjoy.  One of the justifications 
some participants in the Women’s Movement have used for excluding transgender women, for 
instance, is that transgender women have experienced and benefited from male privilege.
112  The 
LGBT Movement’s exclusion of bisexuals often relies on privilege-based arguments as well.
113  
This rhetoric may indicate that movement participants suffer from tunnel vision in their 
conception of social inequality, recognizing only that privilege that is wielded along the axis of 
the identity trait around which the movement is organized and ignoring all other types of 
privilege.  Thus, a feminist might recognize the privilege that a transgender woman once enjoyed 
by virtue of being born male while failing to recognize the discrimination that she experiences by 
virtue of being transgender.  But an alternative explanation may shed additional light on the 
phenomenon of purification: privilege-based rhetoric may be a psychological reaction to 
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replication as well as a strategic one.  In this conception, non-privileged movement participants 
are frustrated that the elite few control the movement’s agenda, but they are dependent on those 
elite few and thus cannot lash out against them.  Instead, they redirect their very legitimate 
frustration at potential members who have not experienced oppression in the same way that they 
have.  They focus their justifiable anger on a less appropriate but safer target. 
As this Part has demonstrated, exclusionary behaviors in identity movements are 
probably rooted not so much in irrational intolerance for human diversity as in an instinct for 
self-preservation.  Movement participants who are not a part of the elite subgroup have very 
limited influence on a movement’s agenda and must often resort to excluding potential members 
in order to preserve even this limited influence.  But these actions artificially restrict movements’ 
growth and cause rifts within identity communities, thereby limiting the extent to which identity 
movements are able to create beneficial changes to the laws and policies that adversely affect 
marginalized communities.  Like replication, purification causes the incentives of individual 
movement members to diverge from the interests of the movement as a whole.  Thus, any 
proposal for curtailing replication and purification must seek to bring these incentives back into 
alignment. 
 
PART III: Recommendations 
  Social movements in general, and identity movements in particular, function best when 
they adopt egalitarian and inclusionary practices.  Part I.A demonstrated that a healthy social 
movement will tend to adopt an agenda that maximizes value for its participants.  Part II.A 
established that in general, the members of such a movement would prefer for many more 
individuals to participate — including individuals with different sets of interests — as more REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  45 
participants means more people to share the costs of bringing about changes to unfavorable legal 
regimes.  But social inequality interferes with these tendencies.  When a select group within the 
movement has much greater access to the channels of legal change than its less privileged 
counterparts, that group becomes an agent for the rest of the movement.  Because of the risk that 
the agent will be unfaithful, the movement is forced to allow that dominant group to control the 
agenda to a great extent.  Then, to protect what little influence within the movement that is 
preserved for them, the more marginalized movement participants take actions intended to 
exclude potential members whose interests diverge from their own.  As a result, the movement is 
artificially limited in both its membership and its accomplishments. 
  But like the model in PART I, the model in PART II is based on somewhat exaggerated 
assumptions.  For one thing, it assumes that a small, elite group has a great deal of power to 
influence lawmaking and that all other movement participants have very little.  Reality is 
probably more complex, as privilege is more of a continuous than a discrete variable.  A more 
nuanced approach to allocating privilege within the movement would likely yield additional 
subclasses of participants with moderate amounts of influence on the instrumentalities of legal 
change.  These moderately privileged participants would share some interests with those with 
little or no privilege and would have some ability to pursue these interests without the approval 
or aid of the most privileged group. 
  In fact, identity movements often exhibit patterns that suggest this kind of subgroup 
independence.  Sometimes these subgroups even manifest as official, separate movements.  The 
Black Feminist Movement, for instance, can be understood as an offshoot of both the Civil 
Rights Movement and the Women’s Movement and has reacted to the failure of both of these REPLICATION AND PURIFICATION IN IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  46 
movements meaningfully to advance the interests of Black women.
114  Similarly, the Lesbian 
Feminist Movement emerged under the umbrellas of both Gay Rights and the Women’s 
Movement, but out of dissatisfaction with both.
115  And the Disability Rights Movement 
encompasses smaller disability-based movements, such as the Deaf Civil Rights Movement
116 
and the Autism Rights Movement,
117 each with its own unique philosophy and objectives.  The 
coexistence of these subgroups with the bigger identity movements to which they relate, even if 
it is not always a peaceful coexistence, is an illustration of the PART I model at work.  Rather 
than only vying for the affections of the elites within the larger movement, those with some 
lesser degree of privilege may simultaneously pursue their own interests by branching off of that 
larger movement.  And often, individuals identify with and contribute to both the larger 
movement and the smaller movement, showing that the coalitions on which the PART I model is 
based remain in operation to some degree in spite of the effects of social inequality. 
  Furthermore, some movement strategies rely less on established privilege than others.  
Professor Jennifer Gordon’s book about the Workplace Project, an immigrant-rights organization 
on Long Island that she founded, provides an interesting case study of this phenomenon.  The 
Workplace Project was originally dependent on the involvement of Gordon, a self-described 
“white, middle-class lawyer with an elite education,”
118 but her goal was to develop the project 
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such that the working-class immigrant population it served could eventually run the project 
without her assistance.
119  In order to achieve this shift in power, the Project originated with a 
“traditional approach,” in which the workers received standard legal services from attorneys,
120 
but transformed into a forum in which immigrants could receive intensive training and support 
for their own structured activism.
121  Gordon justifies this empowerment-focused approach on 
the basis of democratic ideals,
122 but it could just as easily be defended as a technique for 
avoiding replication and purification and the destructive effects these tendencies have on 
identity-based movements.  Similarly, accounts of the Occupy Wall Street movement 
demonstrate that a social movement can create headlines through tactics that do not rely on elite 
access.
123   
  Finally, the PART II model does not take into account the additional incentives that might 
steer privileged members away from the most self-serving courses of action.  Identity 
movements often grow out of natural human communities, and as such, their members have 
strong social bonds.  The most privileged members, even once they are in a position to advance 
their own interests, are often constrained by feelings of loyalty toward that community.  They 
frequently depend on the less privileged movement participants for more than mere contributions 
to the movement, because the less privileged provide them with a great deal of social, emotional, 
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and other types of intangible support.
124  The elite group may in turn accede to some of the less 
privileged members’ requests, perhaps out of social convention or perhaps out of fear that the 
less privileged members will withdraw the intangible support they offer.  Furthermore, close 
interpersonal ties may make it easier for the less privileged participants to monitor whether or 
not the elite members are actually performing agreed-upon duties, thus reducing agency 
problems.  This scenario actually resembles the possibility, discussed above,
125 that less 
privileged groups could induce the elite group’s participation in a more collectively favorable 
movement by sweetening the pot.  The difference is that instead of direct payment, the less 
privileged group induces cooperation through subtle, intangible means.  Although in the short 
run, these factors may do little to counteract purification, since the elite subgroup is still limited 
in its capacity to advocate legal changes, they may mitigate replication by making the 
movement’s agenda less lopsided in favor of the most privileged participants. 
  These examples demonstrate that identity movements do not actually adhere perfectly to 
the PART II model, but instead exhibit a mix of characteristics from both models.  In some ways, 
participants are dependent on an elite subgroup that is essentially self-serving, and this 
dependency has destructive effects on the movement.  But in other ways, identity movements are 
able to break out of these dynamics and exhibit tendencies more characteristic of the model in 
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PART I.  These observations are more than just comforting; they are crucial to understanding 
how the leaders and participants of an identity movement can shape the movement’s dynamics 
such that it responds better to all constituents, is more inclusive of potential contributors, and 
ultimately effects greater change in the laws that serve to entrench social inequality. 
  Identity-based social movements striving to counteract replication and purification, then, 
should rely on tactics that do not require the participation of the most elite members whenever 
such tactics are both feasible and promising.  That includes offering moral support to smaller 
branch movements, even if they break off based on philosophical differences.  At times, 
however, relying on the special access of the elite groups is the most effective method of 
changing law and policy, in spite of its drawbacks.  After all, many of the most significant 
accomplishments of identity movements have occurred through Supreme Court litigation, an 
avenue that is arguably one of the least accessible to the non-privileged.
126  In those situations, 
non-privileged participants should appeal to the sense of community and moral responsibility 
that often inspire selfless, rather than self-interested, action on the part of movement elites.  And 
at all stages of organization, movement participants should attempt to foster community and 
social cohesion along with their political alliances. 
 
Conclusion 
Progressive changes in law and policy over the past century have relied critically on 
identity-based social movements, and they will likely continue to do so.  Yet scholars and 
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activists have long recognized, albeit on a case-by-case basis, that these movements often 
perpetuate the many facets of social inequality that are unrelated to the ones they seek to alter.  
This paper has offered a unified theory to explain the process by which this perpetuation occurs.  
One might expect different oppressed groups to be natural allies, but this attractive ideal has 
rarely been borne out.  Perhaps, though, a more thorough investigation into the mechanisms 
through which social movements function to silence sympathetic voices might help movements 
to curb these tendencies.  After all, minimizing replication and purification in identity-based 
social movements is not merely a matter of fairness and moral legitimacy.  For the movements 
that have a chance to dissipate the social inequality that pervades American law and politics, it is 
an issue that shapes their effectiveness, survival, and longevity. 
 
 
 
 
 